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This article details the application of energy justice as an analytic lens for exploring social 
acceptability of energy systems flexibility and governance in the UK. Drives towards the uptake of 
inflexible, low-carbon generation technologies are expected to generate new challenges for 
balancing energy supply with demand, requiring changes in network management. From the uptake 
of new storage technologies to shifts in practices and governance, such changes may impact on 
everyday energy users in a variety of ways. Drawing on data collected from deliberative workshops 
conducted in England, Scotland and Wales, we examine how members of the public interpret and 
respond to six models for governing future, more flexible energy systems. In so doing, we illustrate 
the value of energy justice literature in making sense of the ways citizens identify and balance 
concerns relating to how distributions of needs, capacities, and benefits, may shape novel forms of 
energy system participation. We also draw attention to the ways in which alternative discourses 
about fairness rooted in neoliberal understandings of market exchange may interact with and 
contradict more socially salient understandings of flexibility justice rooted in concern for vulnerable 
groups.  
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System flexibility has emerged as a key concern in ongoing debates over transitions to low and zero 
carbon energy systems. At the root of this issue is the concern that new nuclear and renewable   
electricity generation will struggle to meet demand profiles which have co-evolved with fossil fuel 
technologies that allow energy to be easily stored, dispatched, ramped-up and curtailed [1, 2]. While 
biomass and hydroelectric generation can mimic some of these characteristics, limits on the 
availability of land and water resources are likely to restrict their use in many cases. Policy makers in 
the UK and around the world have thus been exploring options to promote flexibility through a 
range of market reforms aiming to incentivise uptake of energy storage and demand flexibility on 
the part of end-users, as well as upgrades to and interconnections between national and 
international energy networks [3-6]. Such changes are needed to absorb greater generation 
instability and spread its impacts over larger populations. The form such incentives will take remain 
uncertain but the final policy mix is likely to include: changes to wholesale markets to ensure that 
costs and benefits producers and consumers impose on the system are better allocated to those 
responsible for them, and incentives for new services such as the provision of capacity, frequency 
and voltage regulation and demand response [2, 4, 7, 8]. 
Given the uncertainty around these changes, it is difficult to predict in advance the effects flexibility 
will have on everyday energy users. Proposals such as dynamic and time-of-use (ToU) energy tariffs 
or new network charges designed to recover the costs of providing flexibility, may in turn impose 
higher or more volatile costs on consumers to which some may struggle to adapt. However, with a 
few notable exceptions [2, 7, 9], the justice implications of such changes are seldom acknowledged 
and have yet to be examined in detail. One reason for this is the heterogeneity of ways in which 
more flexible socio-technical systems for energy may emerge [10]. Some such as interconnection, 
peak-time thermal energy generation or bulk energy storage may be highly centralised and 
incorporated into existing billing structures, thus entailing very little change beyond local 
communities affected by their construction. Alternatively, decentralised or ‘user led’ options may 
entail citizens hosting storage in their homes and communities; adjusting energy demands in 
response to ToU pricing; becoming active ‘prosumers’; nodes in aggregated energy networks 
operated by private or municipally run energy service companies [10, 11]. More broadly, the degree 
to which transitions towards flexibility are perceived as just, may be shaped by a range of values and 
concerns rooted in the differentiated roles citizens may take in relation to energy [12, 13], not just as 
consumers or investors but as citizens, tax-payers, members of community energy and civil society 
organisations with distinct visions of what future energy systems should look like.  
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Energy justice matters for system flexibility because to a large extent, the success or failure of 
various strategies for providing it will be contingent upon the active involvement or passive 
toleration of lay citizens [14]. Wider literatures on public perceptions of energy systems change have 
consistently found the fair allocation of risks and benefits, the equitable inclusion of citizens in 
decision processes effecting their lives to be significant factors shaping how energy technologies and 
systems are received [15]. Such factors have been shown to be key in shaping how new 
infrastructure may be received by local communities [16-18], preferences for financing energy 
system decarbonisation [19-21] and in some instances, uptake of low-carbon practices and lifestyles 
[22]. Notwithstanding the persuasive normative argument for ensuring energy system transitions 
should be conducted in a just manner [23], there are thus sound instrumental and substantive 
reasons for ensuring design of flexibility options takes into account issues of fairness and equity at 
an early stage.  
Our overall aim in this paper is twofold. Firstly, we examine potential justice concerns emerging in 
relation to drives towards systems flexibility using a bottom-up approach grounded in interactions 
between citizens with little stake in the UK energy system beyond their everyday participation within 
it. Secondly, we compare the results of this approach to the more top-down evaluative frameworks 
employed in the energy justice literature in order to identify convergences and divergences between 
citizen views and theoretically derived justice concerns.  We draw on deliberative workshop data 
collected in England, Scotland and Wales between July and October 2017 examining public 
perceptions of a broad range of socio-technical options for managing systems flexibility.  Our 
analysis draws on procedural, distributive and recognition based conceptions of energy justice [24], 
to illustrate how energy justice literatures intersect with understandings of present and potential 
future energy systems as more or less exploitative, open to citizen involvement and control and 
amenable to the distinct needs of vulnerable groups.  We then address the emergence within our 
data of an alternative discourse pertaining to compensation for flexibility services which occurred in 
parallel with and partial contradiction to energy justice claims. In conclusion we examine the ways in 
which energy justice scholarship can assist in developing more socially acceptable models of systems 
flexibility, and the challenges it may face in doing. 
II. Justice and Flexibility in UK Energy Policy 
In the UK and many other advanced capitalist economies, different conceptualisations of fairness or 
justice have been advanced in policy over time. Drives towards energy market liberalisation during 
the 1970s were, in part justified in terms of rebalancing the distribution of benefits from public 
4 | P a g e  
 
 
energy investments towards consumers via a neoliberal framework of privatisation and competition 
[25, 26]. This shift also saw the removal of democratic control over energy investment and 
infrastructure planning, moving these to the purview of businesses and the market. While attending 
to both distribution and procedure, these shifts did not occur within a social justice framework, but 
were rather authorised by a conceptualisation of liberty, particularly over property rights as the sole 
basis upon which individuals can exercise moral choice [27]. In this view, energy market 
liberalisation was just, to the extent that it extended liberty to invest and own energy assets free 
from overbearing state regulation and the power of vested interests [28]. As prices rose during the 
2000’s and climate change rose up the political agenda, new measures were introduced predicated 
on the recognition of vulnerabilities both on the part of some consumer groups such as the poor and 
elderly, and on the part of future generations who may be susceptible to climate change impacts. 
Such changes appeared to herald a more interventionist policy stance, albeit within market 
frameworks where possible [29, 30]. This stance remains visible in requirements for the system 
regulator to consider the impacts of its decisions on vulnerable groups and the environment; 
obligations on energy suppliers to provide subsidised energy efficiency measures to vulnerable 
households; direct payments to households deemed to be at risk of fuel poverty; and a host of new 
market and non-market mechanisms to promote the introduction of low carbon generating capacity. 
Critiques of such measures have focussed on their overall inadequacy [30], as well as the non or 
deliberate mis-recognition of some vulnerable groups’ needs [31], and allocative procedures which 
inequitably distribute or restrict access to support [32].  
Turning to more contemporary debates around energy system flexibility, some interventions such as 
smart and demand side response technologies have been touted in straightforward liberal terms as 
empowering consumers [33], providing them with the tools needed to manage and optimise their 
energy conduct more efficiently [34]. However, should such measures fail to anticipate the needs of 
groups who lack the ability to engage in flexibility, they may risk exacerbating pre-existing 
inequalities [9]. Public perceptions research into smart energy networks have consistently found 
concerns that groups such as the elderly, chronically ill, disabled and low income families may have 
specific energy needs that are unsusceptible to time-shifting, and may lack the financial and 
knowledge capacities needed to engage with smart systems designed to automate such processes 
[35-37]. Other concerns have been identified in the degree of control and autonomy domestic users 
may need to surrender to distant energy suppliers [35, 38]. Questions have been raised over 
dominant industry and policy framings around demand side response, which have tended to reduce 
the role of the end-user either to that of mindless automata responding unthinkingly to external 
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price signals, or as entirely passive recipients of energy whose use is managed for them by 
ubiquitous smart technology [39, 40]. As Goulden et al. [40] discuss, both framings pose significant 
questions for citizens ability to meaningfully influence how their energy service needs are defined 
and met, and risk closing down opportunities for more economically and socially rewarding forms of 
energy citizenship from which more democratic and socially just energy systems may emerge. 
III. Energy Justice  
While the literature on energy justice is relatively new, it is preceded by long standing concerns in 
social, environmental and climate change research arising from: unequal distributions of costs and 
benefits associated with new policies and infrastructures; the closure of decision making procedures 
to input and contestation from affected communities, and; failures to recognise the distinct needs of 
traditionally marginalised communities [24, 41, 42]. Within this triumvirate of energy justice 
concerns, distributive, procedural and recognition justice have themselves been expressed in diverse 
ways.  
Although not always made explicit, many approaches to energy justice take as their starting point 
social justice considerations derived from John Rawls [43], wherein a fair distribution of primary 
goods forms the foundation from which a free individual may pursue his or her own desired ends 
[23, 44, 45]. For Rawls [45] and his adherents, this approach has the benefit of specifying general 
moral principles appropriate to a plurality of needs, and to which any rational person may agree if 
they were taking that decision in ignorance their own material position. Thus distributive justice can 
be used to discuss spatial inequalities, such as reductions in social welfare imposed on local 
communities by infrastructure built for the benefit of larger populations [46, 47]. It can also refer to 
temporal inequalities, whereby infrastructure benefiting those in the present carries economic and 
environmental impacts to be borne by future generations [23, 48]. Finally, distributive justice may 
also point to the potential for inequalities in access to energy services, which may arise from income 
or position in other social hierarchies, which may itself have spatial or temporal elements [49, 50].   
Apart from the distribution of material goods, for Rawls [45] the ability to participate in decision 
making processes can also be seen as a prerequisite for pursuing one’s desired ends, and may thus 
also be accorded the status of a basic good which ought to be evenly distributed. However to the 
extent it deals in the means of social organisation rather than its outcomes, procedural justice tends 
to be treated as a distinct principle in and of itself [23]. Procedural justice goes beyond narrow 
provisions for consultative or engagement processes to demand equal opportunities to access 
information, contest and rebut the arguments of others and generally participate on an equal 
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footing, with the expectation that proposals can be altered or revoked and that decisions will be 
taken in a fair and transparent manner [42, 51]. Although claims to procedural justice are likely to be 
particularly acute in instances where unfair procedures give rise to distributive injustices, some 
formulations argue that exclusions of interested parties or adverse effects on them do not need to 
be actualised in order for a claim of procedural injustice to be made, rather the potential for such 
harms to arise is sufficient to constitute an injustice [52]. While primarily associated with decisions 
over resource extraction, infrastructure siting and redress for affected communities [42], procedural 
justice has also been deployed as a lens for considering policy processes around energy 
consumption, for example access to information and representation for disadvantaged consumers 
[53], and for examining how issues of identity and place attachment may be reconciled with low 
carbon infrastructures and practices [47, 54].  
Drawing on theories of identity and intersectionality, recognition justice begins from the standpoint 
that significant injustices can arise from a failure to grant equal social status and respect to some 
groups within society based on our common humanity [55-57]. In so doing, they argue that many 
procedural and distributive injustices stem from historical failings to recognise and respect 
differences in the knowledge, values and needs of specific groups within society [53]. Recognition 
justice thus lies not only in the claim that failure to recognise difference restricts the ability of 
marginalised groups to pursue goals and lifestyles according to the values and concerns they deem 
most appropriate, but also that such failings place the marginalised in a relation of subordination in 
which they are unable to participate fully as equal and respected members of society [56]. In this 
view,  processes of non-recognition, misrecognition and stigmatisation may underpin but are 
irreducible to inequalities in the distribution of energy services, and the exclusion of marginalised 
knowledges and values from the processes and institutions through which that system is governed 
[41, 58, 59]. While recognition based injustices may often be attributable to direct forms of 
prejudice and discrimination, they can also occur by less deliberate means, for example the provision 
of energy efficiency measures based on informational provision or financial contributions which may 
be inaccessible to groups such as the poor, elderly, or disabled, thus preventing them from 
participating in and receiving the benefits of societal shifts towards decarbonisation [60, 61].  
This is not to say all approaches to energy justice are rooted in distributive, procedural or 
recognition based justice frameworks, nor that anyone should take precedence over others. As 
Sovacool and Dworkin (2015) point out, energy justice may also be thought of as a ‘synthetic 
concept’, comprising a tri-partite framework of distributive, procedural and recognition-based 
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concerns, which may be informed by a range of moral philosophies. In the following analysis we do 
not aim to impose any singular justice framework onto the discourse of our participants. Rather we 
borrow concepts from across the energy justice literature in order to make sense of diverse concerns 
relating to energy systems flexibility. In so doing our analysis illustrates the emergence of a range of 
conceptualisations of fairness and justice in lay discourse of energy systems flexibility, of which 
concerns centred around distributional impacts and recognising difference formed key threads. 
IV. Methods 
The unfamiliarity of most citizens with the functioning of the UK energy systems [62], combined with 
the diverse impacts and social values upon which systems flexibility may impinge, required a 
methodological approach capable of communicating to participants what systems flexibility might 
involve, while remaining open to a broad variety of responses and value positions to emerge. 
Deliberative research takes as its starting point a view of democratic governances as requiring not 
only the trappings of representation and voting, but also a commitment to communicative 
interaction, held on an equal footing between citizens, allowing for a plurality of possibly conflicting 
values and ideas to be heard and either condensed into a collective decision [63-65], or at least given 
voice in order to illuminate the terrain of political debate and contestation [66]. Deliberative 
approaches have been seen as particularly appropriate in the field of sociotechnical evaluation 
where the long-term consequences of decisions are unclear, and where the most appropriate course 
of action may depend as much on ideas and social values as on techno-economic criteria [67-69]. A 
key benefit of deliberative research is a commitment to the provision of balanced informational 
inputs which aim to shed light on the issue under discussion to facilitate informed reflection and 
debate, while at the same time framing discussions in such a way as to leave space for participants 
have space to question, criticise and develop their own evaluative criteria for assessing proposed 
innovations [70-72].  
Deliberative process can range from large-scale societal processes involving large numbers of 
citizens over a prolonged period or smaller scale focus groups, workshops or citizen juries that 
convene for shorter periods on a single topic, but all involve convening groups of citizens in 
facilitated discussion round a specific issue [73]. The model of deliberative workshops reported on 
here tends towards the shorter, small-group end of this spectrum, in which the primary emphasis is 
on participants learning about and discussing an issue via a series of informational inputs, structured 
activities and open-ended discussions, without necessarily seeking to crystalise those views into an 
individual or collective decision [72, 74]. In this way they bear close similarities to in-depth forms of 
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focus group enquiry [75, 76], in which the careful design of stimulus materials and discussion 
framings aims to offer a variety of positions and repertoires on which participants may draw in 
response to a particular issue.  
The analysis on which this paper is based is derived from four deliberative workshops held between 
July and October 2017 in Aberdeen, Scotland; Abergavenny, Wales; and Birmingham (x2), England.  
Workshops lasted approximately 7 hours, and each was attended by 11-12 participants who were 
paid a £100 honorarium for taking part. Participants were recruited topic-blind by a professional 
market research company in each location in order to capture a diverse range of backgrounds and 
political perspectives. Given the role of shared experience and context in shaping views of socio-
technical change [75, 77], we recruited the two Birmingham groups either to include suburban 
homeowners or urban tenants living in rented accommodation. Recruitment in Abergavenny 
focused upon rural residents, typically living in larger properties in an area lacking connection to the 
national gas grid, and thus already reliant on domestic scale energy storage in the form of oil tanks 
or electrically powered heat storage (storage heaters and hot water tanks). Aberdeen was selected 
to reflect an area with significant past experience of energy infrastructure in the form of an 
established oil and gas industry as well as more recent low carbon energy projects. Aberdeen and 
Abergavenny participants were mixed in terms of housing tenure and recruited from the urban 
centre as well as surrounding suburbs and countryside. A complete breakdown of participants can 
be found in table 1. 
Workshops began with a discussion of participants’ current ideas and feelings about the UK energy 
system, before introducing details of a range of technologies for enhancing the flexibility of the UK 
energy system. A full protocol and all stimulus materials used in each workshop can be found 
elsewhere [citation removed for peer review]. The analysis below was derived predominantly from 
afternoon sessions, which focused on discussion of six posters detailing archetypal models for 
governing energy systems flexibility, each entailing a different relationship between citizens and 
wider socio-technical systems, however we also present data from wider discussions to illustrate 
how views evolved throughout the day.  
 





Table 1: Breakdown of participants by workshop location 
































































































































Design of governance models was informed by a review of the literature and discussions with energy 
systems experts and aimed to reflect how implementing flexibility at different scales of 
centralisation may entail different relationships between users and the energy system. Three levels 
of centralisation were considered: centralised systems managed by large energy suppliers and the 
transmission network operator; community scale systems largely managed by municipal authorities 
or civil society organisations, and; domestic, focused on household level generation and storage 
operating independently from the network or as part of smaller micro-grids. Within each of these 
participants were presented with two options reflecting a high degree of user participation in 
flexibility provision, and a lower level reflecting differing degrees of automation and control. Posters 
were written and piloted with colleagues and members of the public in advance to ensure that each 
provided a clear and distinct vision for managing flexibility, while at the same time leaving room for 
creative interpretation of their implications for society and everyday life. The six models are 
illustrated in figure 1 and described briefly below, copies of each poster are can be found in the 
supplementary material accompanying this article. 
 
Figure 1: Models for governing energy system flexibility by degree of centralisation and engagement 
1) Traditional consumer: A highly centralised model in which responsibility for flexibility provision 
remains with energy company operated generation and storage on the national transmission 
network. Citizen engagement with storage limited to seeing new storage infrastructure on the 
landscape and additional network costs mentioned on bills.  
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2) New routines: Transmission network remains highly centralised, but flexibility is provided via 
domestic demand response, incentivised via ToU tariffs set by large energy companies. Citizens 
have the option of paying more, engaging in demand response practices or investing in smart 
appliances to help automate the process.  
3) Local energy company: Local and municipal authorities take on greater responsibility for local 
energy distribution networks. Councils own and operate energy generation and storage to 
balance supply and demand in their area. 
4) Community ownership: Local communities take on greater responsibility for energy distribution 
networks. Civil society organisations form to invest in energy generation and storage, sometimes 
with investment from private businesses. 
5) Virtual power plant: Micro-generation and storage is increasingly deployed in homes which split 
off into smaller sub-distribution scale micro-grids. Energy service companies match homes with 
available generation and or storage to those requiring energy services and engage in trading 
with other virtual grids to manage excesses and shortfalls in capacity. 
6) Energy Independence: Micro-generation and storage is increasing deployed in homes in order to 
maximise consumption of self-produced energy. Households increasingly begin to split off from 
the local and national energy networks. 
Participants were split into two groups of 5-6 and were asked to examine, comment upon and 
discuss three posters at a time. After 35 minutes groups swapped rooms so all participants had an 
opportunity to discuss every governance model, and this fed into whole group discussion later in the 
day. Discussions were moderated by authors 1 & 2 and transcribed prior to analysis.  
Analysis was thematic in nature [78] and undertaken by the lead author in extensive discussion with 
both co-authors. Themes were developed in an iterative process, initially from listening to workshop 
recordings and subsequently through transcript coding using Nvivo 11. In the first instance emergent 
themes within discussion were identified and refined through repeated readings of, and 
comparisons between transcripts. However, as analysis proceeded the authors increasingly referred 
to the energy justice literature in order to make sense of and further refine themes emerging around 
issues of fairness, equity and independence. The references to energy justice in this paper thus 
represent a complimentary scaffold around which analysis developed, rather than a top-down 
analytical frame imposed upon the data from the outset.  As a compliment to thematic analysis, 
following Halkier [79] we also examined elements of participants discourse and interactions in order 
to better understand how participants situated themselves in relation to key normative principles. In 
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particular, we drew on tools from interpretive and discourse analytic traditions to examine how 
participants invoked popular narratives, metaphors [80, 81], and legitimising strategies [82] to make 
sense of and situate themselves in relation to different governance models. This approach did not 
aim to identify new themes or discourses, but rather to add depth to our account of how 
participants were using justice discourses to make sense of the desires and concerns discussion of 
energy systems change evoked for them. 
While we are confident the approach taken yielded a broad spectrum of discourses in relation to 
energy systems flexibility and justice, we do not claim our findings to be statistically representative 
at the population level, or to represent the totality of perspectives available within society. While we 
did reach a point of saturation during analysis in which further analysis ceased to yield new insights 
[78], it is possible that conduct of further workshops, for example with groups exhibiting pre-existing 
interests or vulnerabilities in relation to energy issues may yield new findings. Despite the 
geographically diverse recruitment of different groups, the single-event format of the workshops 
have made it difficult to attribute particular perspectives to particular areas and as such the findings 
discussed below are restricted to discourses appearing across groups. Despite this, in our judgement 
there were some differences in emphasis across groups, which may be attributable to differences 
between geographic and housing contexts. Further, more focused research, particularly in relation 
to rural communities and tenants of rented accommodation would be needed to confirm these 
suspicions, and for this reason we have not included them here. Finally, we would note that the 
participant discourse reported below emerged under particular framing conditions around flexibility 
technologies and the socio-technical relations under which they may function. While we attempted 
to keep these options as broad as possible, an alternative framing centred on the needs and desires 
of society or local communities [83], may well have elicited different discourses.  
V.i Centralised systems- distributive justice and the ‘money-making machine’ 
One of the most salient discourses emerging during workshops was around energy as an essential 
public good, which ought not to be subject to the functioning of unmitigated market forces 
[Reference removed for peer review]. This distributive concern manifest early in the day, in talk 
relating to current energy retail practices where a clear discourse emerged constructing large energy 
companies as dishonest, profiteering and lacking in transparency. This manifest in constructions of 
energy companies as: “rip-off merchants” (Steven, B2), who “just want to make profit”’ (Imran, Abd), 
and are out to “bamboozle you” (Ken, B1) with complex tariffs designed to confuse and disorientate 
consumers. The sum of this view was a feeling that distributions of benefits within the UK energy 
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system disproportionately favour large companies at the expense of consumers, and that complex 
pricing arrangements make it difficult for citizens to adequately exercise the procedural remedy of 
switching suppliers. Rather, as the below extract from a discussion between Jessica and Author 1 
illustrates, centralised energy systems tended to be constructed as exploitative of both citizens and 
the natural environment:  
“Jessica (Abd): It’s the reliance on them, like we depend on them but I don’t want to have to depend 
on them because there’s plenty of natural resources that we could channel without having to pay for 
them as standard …  
Moderator: That’s interesting.  So what would you like to do instead, instead of relying on these—? 
Jessica (Abd): Make my own Energy… Or at least [for it to] be easier, that part of the energy that you 
can have could be created naturally as opposed to through a money-making machine.” 
Taken from discussions early in the day and prior to the presentation of distinct governance options 
for flexibility, Jessica here is trying to outline what it is she perceives as unjust about centralised 
models for governing flexibility, while trying to imagine a more positive alternative. By characterising 
the existing system as a relationship of dependence on a “money making machine” she draws 
attention to what she perceives as a double injustice in distribution with large energy companies 
exploiting both consumers and the natural environment for their own benefit. The machine 
metaphor operates to underscore both the unresponsive and uncaring nature of the system itself, 
and to underscore its capacity for environmental damage.  
Table 2: Summary of Energy justice discourses relating to dissatisfaction with large energy suppliers 





Citizens feel exploited by 
relationship with large 
energy suppliers. 
Market relationships limit 
citizens ability to remedy 
unfair treatment. 
Citizen desires for greater 
autonomy and sustainability 
within the energy system not 
recognised in centralized 
systems dominated by large 
suppliers and mass 
consumption. 
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V.ii Decentralised systems- just distributions and empowerment   
Jessica’s construction of centralised models of energy provision as dependence on a money-making 
machine, points to a wider sense of alienation which was voiced in manifold ways across the 
workshops. In some cases, reliance on low-engagement solutions to systems flexibility was 
constructed as fostering inattentive or careless attitudes towards energy that could better be 
addressed through more localised and tangible forms of energy generation and storage. In others, 
alienation from the centralised energy system manifest in discourses which constructed domestic 
energy independence or communal generation as part of a wider vision of self-sufficiency in which 
reliance on exploitative consumer relationships are a thing of the past: 
‘I like the idea of being able to just not rely on other things.  So if I could grow my own—if I had 
room to grow my own veg and that kind of thing, I’d do it.  I don’t, but I would if I had the choice.  So 
I think if I could make my own stuff and generate my own stuff, then I’d just be, a lot less pressure 
on paying for this and that, that I can’t do that somebody else can, cut down on the bills in the long 
run, whereas it costs a lot to do it all in the first place, then once it’s there, it’s there for you and 
then your kids can pass it on and their kids and it just keeps going.’ (Lesley, Abd) 
Referring to combination of micro-solar and battery storage, the above extract from Lesley is 
emblematic of self-sufficiency discourses appearing across all workshops, constructing self-
generation and consumption as inevitably being less costly than buying energy from a large 
company. Her references to reducing bills for herself and future generations by generating energy 
without mediation by external companies, points first and foremost to the same distributive claim 
outlined by Jessica above, that without corporate interests the benefits of energy generation can be 
more fairly shared by consumers. However, her association of energy self-sufficiency with food and 
intergenerational transfers also points to a desire for autonomy and sustainability in which closer 
relationships between human beings and the natural environment appear as valued functionings 
that decentralised energy generation and storage technologies may enable.  
Similar sentiments were expressed by other participants in favour of community and municipal 
forms of flexibility provision. Rather than novel technologies empowering householders to achieve 
previously unrecognised lifestyle aims, community and municipal flexibility were seen as means of 
building local capacities and empowering communities. At times this was spoken of as an ethically 
desirable end in and of itself such as in talk of “bring[ing] communities closer together” (Imran, Abd), 
or building “community spirit” (Jessica, B2). In other instances it was seen as a means of addressing 
distributional inequalities whereby distant centralised energy suppliers extracted money from 
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communities by bringing generation and storage assets into communities themselves: “You’d think 
almost that it belonged to you” (Miles, Abv). In this sense, decentralised, high engagement forms of 
flexibility governance came to be seen as not only correcting perceived distributional inequalities but 
also as recognising and building capacities for new forms of participation in the energy system which 
several participants found intuitively attractive. 
In contrast, discussion of more traditional, centralised forms of flexibility management based 
on interconnection or (low-carbon) thermal generation were often characterised by a sense 
of powerlessness and dissatisfaction: “It smacks to me of ‘Because you couldn't be bothered, 
we [centralised providers] gave you what we wanted to give you’…” (Marco, B2). In this view 
traditional supplier-consumer models were constructed as failing to recognise legitimate 
desires for more empowering domestic, community or municipal systems for energy 
generation and management and thus shutting down opportunities for citizens to become 
involved in such activities. Not only was this seen as a form of procedural injustice denying 
greater civic participation in the energy system, it was also seen as failing to recognise 
desires for alternative lifestyles and forms of social organisation that may underpin more 
just distributions of energy system benefits.  
Table 3: Summary of energy justice discourses relating to community and domestic flexibility provision 





Community scale flexibility 
may redistribute benefits 
from large suppliers to 
communities and 
households but may also 
disproportionately benefit 
wealthier households and 
communities. 
May empower citizens and 
communities to take on 
greater roles and 
responsibilities in 
managing energy system. 
May help meet desires for 
more autonomous and 
sustainable lifestyles which 
are denied by more 
centralized systems. 
 
V.iii Recognising differences: capacities, vulnerability and distributive injustice 
While high engagement forms of flexibility provision were presented by some participants as a 
means of addressing distributional and recognition injustices, counter discourses also emerged 
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which problematised high engagement forms of flexibility provision based on ToU pricing as posing 
significant potential for injustice. Generally, such discourse centred around the claim that proposals 
for community and domestic storage failed to recognise the inability of specific groups to access 
these options. For some this manifest in concerns that that low-income groups would struggle to 
gain access to cost saving domestic storage technologies or community storage schemes due to high 
costs. The following extract from Danielle raises concerns about the ability of some households to 
contribute financially and thus benefit from community scale energy storage: 
“Because, there’s a lot of people in communities that are poor, you know, and struggling along every 
day to go to them and say, ‘Look. We’re going to do this community ownership, you know, we need 
£300 from you.’ Some people are lucky if they’ve got £3 in the bank, so it would be difficult.” 
(Danielle, Abd) 
Sentiments such as the above were expressed not only in relation to community energy storage, but 
also flexibility models requiring the purchase of domestic storage or smart technologies, and point 
to a concern that at the needs of economically disadvantaged groups should not go unrecognised.  
Stronger claims of distributive injustice centred on the possibility that poorer households on ToU 
tariffs may end up subsidising wealthier households and communities to invest in generation and 
storage technologies, allowing them to benefit from dynamic pricing at the expense of others: “And 
the rich people will also sell the electric to the poor people, so they’ll benefit from it and profit from it 
and the poor people are maybe worse off” (Tristan, B2). Others, such as Marian expressed worries 
that uptake of energy independence and community storage among the rich could shrink the 
customer base of the national grid, increasing costs for those still reliant upon the residual 
centralised infrastructure: “…if a lot of people started doing that and like you said, started sourcing 
out the electric and it did push company prices up for, let’s say, poor people, it probably would be a 
problem then” (Marian, B2). Mirroring concerns raised in the energy justice literature critiquing the 
distributive impacts of energy efficiency and micro-generation subsidies and emerging literatures on 
grid defection and ‘utility death spirals’ [84, 85], participants across groups displayed both a nuanced 
understanding of how failure to recognise pre-existing inequalities may lead to flexibility transitions 
further disadvantaging poorer households.  
In addition to lack of economic capacities, participants also pointed to differences in needs which 
may render some social groups particularly vulnerable to transitions towards system flexibility. 
Particular concern was expressed for groups such as the elderly, disabled, shift workers and parents 
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who may struggle to afford or utilise smart appliances and storage systems, adjust their patterns of 
energy use or attend meetings about community energy projects. Across groups this tended to 
result in a discourse in which high engagement modes of flexibility provision may be justifiable, but 
only for those social groups with the ability to engage with them: “I think it’s more for the younger 
person who’s more into this technology. The likes of me, I’m terrible with phones, computers and all 
the rest of it, so it wouldn't—I couldn't do it” (Jack, Abv). Other participants were more open minded 
about extending high engagement technologies into the homes of more vulnerable groups but 
highlighted the need for additional support to ensure elderly and disabled citizens could access them 
without suffering detriment: “I’m a support worker and the people I support wouldn’t manage to do 
that, so they’d need the extra help” (Danielle, Abd). 
Concerns such as those voiced above by Danielle and Jack, tended to centre on a belief that while 
economically and technologically capable citizens will be able to mitigate higher peak-time energy 
pricing other groups may be disadvantaged or rendered vulnerable. Such perceptions of injustice 
often manifest in a discourse of ‘penalties’ falling on households and communities who, for no fault 
of their own may experience disbenefits due to their inability to engage in flexibility investment or 
practices. The below exchange between Amy and Ken is illustrative of this discourse:  
“Amy (B1): Disabled people on dialysis machines, and…things that they have, you know, and these 
oxygen things that they need to use during the day time. 
Ken (B1): I think its balance, and obviously… [it should be] tailored to individual needs, but you 
shouldn’t be penalised.”   
Deploying the example of disabled citizens who rely on electrically powered medical equipment, 
Amy is drawing attention to groups within society whose energy needs may be unsusceptible to 
adjustment in the face of changing information or price structures. Concern for the elderly and 
disabled was a prominent theme in such discussions, possibly reflecting established tropes in 
neoliberal energy and welfare discourses which do recognise (albeit unevenly) vulnerabilities 
imposed by age and infirmity [81]. The first part of Ken’s response that balance is needed, caveats 
his own concerns about ToU pricing by accepting, at least in principle, some potential benefits of 
high engagement modes of flexibility provision. However, in following this to suggest price 
structures should reflect individual needs and avoid imposing penalties, Ken shifts from a focus on 
vulnerable groups to the universal: ‘you shouldn’t be penalised’.  
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The belief that novel market forms may disadvantage energy consumers carries two implications. 
First it led some participants to reconsider some of their scepticism over low-engagement modes of 
flexibility governance. Reasoning that current market models at least provide a degree of price 
stability and predictability, socialising costs and allowing vulnerable groups to budget, some 
participants expressed a desire for this to be replicated or extended in future governance 
arrangements. Others, such as Danielle outlined the possibility for hybrid schemes in which 
municipal or national agencies work in tandem with domestic and community initiatives so that: 
“the council… steps in a lot [for] people with not a lot of money” (Danielle, Abd). Secondly, and more 
importantly discourses around penalties point analytically towards a view that energy is not simply a 
commodity to be bought and sold on the basis of supply and demand, for many citizens it is an 
essential public good on which they depend. In such instances leveraging energy prices as a form of 
incentive or punishment, seemed wrong and as unjustly disadvantaging social groups least able to 
respond. In this view, energy is just the kind of basic good or enabling condition referred to in the 
energy and social justice literature and as such, should be subject to the kinds of distributive and 
recognition based concerns described therein. This argument went well beyond protecting groups 
traditionally identified as vulnerable in UK energy policy discourse such as the elderly and low-
income households.  
Table 4: Summary of Energy Justice discourses relating to capacities and vulnerability 




Differences in financial and 
social capacities may lead 
to some groups being 
further disadvantaged 
under community and 
domestic forms of 
flexibility pro[86]vision. 
Some sections of 
community may lack time 
or social resources 
required to become 
involved in community or 
municipal energy 
governance. 
The needs of those lacking the 
ability to engage in flexibility 
technologies and practices 
not recognised by many 
proposals for domestic and 
community scale flexibility. 
 
V.iv Neoliberal fairness-compensation for services rendered 
While the bulk of justice claims emerging in workshops closely resembled concerns common in the 
energy justice literature, other discourses were also in play. Emerging alongside and in partial 
contradiction to recognition and distributive concerns, an alternative discourse framed flexibility as a 
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service citizens may render to the energy system through the adjustment of daily routines, 
investments in domestic or community scale storage or participation in virtual power-plant type 
arrangements. Such actions were, at times, discussed as a form of responsible or pro-social 
behaviour which deserved to be rewarded:  
“I expect lower prices…Because you’re storing that for them.  They don’t have to have this massive 
storage facility that you’re sending all this electricity back to, if you are storing some of it within your 
own home.”  (Harriet, B1) 
Above, Harriet outlines an explicitly reciprocal arrangement through which households render 
flexibility services to the energy system in exchange for lower bills. Her perspective closely mirroring 
policy discourses emphasising the need for market reforms to ensure contributions to system 
stability are fairly compensated in the allocation of costs and benefits. In some cases such claims 
may reflect appeals to distributive justice whereby loss of convenience, space in the home or 
enforced expenditure on storage is viewed as an unjust imposition on energy users, particularly if 
not also imposed on suppliers, who participants felt had disproportionately benefited from energy 
retail arrangements in recent years. However for most participants, including Harriet, commitments 
to compensation sat uneasily alongside concerns that such compensation may come at the expense 
of vulnerable groups unable to make such adjustments. 
Generally, contradictions between these two conceptualisations of fairness went unacknowledged. 
However, on occasion the tension between the two manifested in direct disagreements between 
participants or stronger articulations of compensation discourses. While the following extract from 
Andy is highly atypical of our participants at large, it is representative of a small minority for whom 
compensation rather than distributive of recognition justice formed the main basis for evaluating 
flexibility governance: 
“That’s the other side of the coin is there’d be a load of do-gooders saying, no, you can’t do 
that because poor people can’t afford to buy a battery, they’ve got to pay more for their 
electric… But that’s kind of tough luck really, isn’t it?  If you don’t work you don’t have 
money, do you? [pause]  That’s a bit cruel, really.” (Andy, Abv) 
Responding to ongoing conversations regarding the potential benefits of battery ownership Andy 
anticipates and aims to counter potential critiques on the basis distributive impacts. This anticipation 
may have arisen partly in response to issues raised earlier in the day regarding rooftop solar panels 
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as well as the presence of wind, solar and anaerobic digestion units in the area, a process some 
participants described negatively as removing land from agricultural production and imposing an 
eyesore on residents while enriching wealthy landowners. At the same time Andy’s reference to ‘do-
gooders’ and assumption that inability to invest in costly battery equipment arises from 
unwillingness to work, reflects common neoliberal discourses on poverty and social exclusion in 
which inequitable outcomes are attributed to laziness, fecklessness and other moral failings on the 
part of the disadvantaged [31, 81].  However, even in this atypically strong rejection of distributive 
and recognition based arguments was followed, after a pause with a partial disavowal: “that’s a bit 
cruel really”. While this hedging statement might in part be directed as softening his perception 
among other participants, the fact he felt obliged to do this is indicative of the wider strength of 
feeling across groups, that pre-existing vulnerabilities ought not to be ignored in governing energy 
systems flexibility.  
VI. Discussion 
In the course of this paper we have illustrated how diverse conceptualisations of justice emerged 
across participant discussions of six models for governing flexibility in future energy systems. In 
many cases these conceptualisations mapped directly onto established categories in the energy 
justice literature (see table 6), for example the strong initial discourse we encountered around the 
perceived distributive injustice of centralised energy systems, and the sense that the procedures of 
market competition offered little recourse to consumers. Initial dissatisfaction with this system did 
much to drive enthusiasm for high engagement modes of flexibility provision. In particular, energy 
independence and community provision came to be seen as enabling new functionings such as 
securing energy free from exploitation by large companies or achieving a degree of sustainability, 
autonomy or collective empowerment that may be unattainable within a more centralised system. 
Such discourses go beyond links thus far established in the literature between procedural justice and 
energy citizenship [40, 54], and point towards emergent conceptualisations of sustainability and 
wellbeing which may be recognised or denied by ongoing transitions towards flexibility. 
While higher engagement and decentralised procedures for managing flexibility were received by 
some participants as enabling greater citizen participation, and hence, fairer distributions of benefits 
within future energy systems, this discourse informed subsequent discussions relating to recognition 
justice. Recognition based discourses tended to centre on the perceived failures of high engagement 
modes of flexibility provision to account for those citizens who, through no fault of their own, may 
lack the economic or social resources to invest in flexibility technologies or adapt their practices in 
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order to mitigate ToU pricing. From families and citizens engaged in unpredictable shift work to the 
elderly and chronically ill, participants described a plethora of conditions they felt could be 
disadvantaged through the imposition of penalties by a one-size fits all approaches to flexibility.  
Table 5: Summary of energy justice discourses relating to systems flexibility 





Citizens feel exploited by 




Market relationships limit 




Citizen desires for greater 
autonomy and 
sustainability within the 
energy system not 
recognised in centralised 
systems dominated by 






Community scale flexibility 
may redistribute benefits from 
large suppliers to communities 
and households but may also 
disproportionately benefit 
wealthier households and 
communities.  
May empower citizens 
and communities to take 
on greater roles and 
responsibilities in 
managing energy system. 
  
May help meet desires for 
more autonomous and 
sustainable lifestyles 
which are denied by more 








Differences in financial and 
social capacity may lead to 
some groups being further 
disadvantaged under 
community and domestic 
forms of flexibility provision. 
Some sections of 
community may lack time 
or social resources 
required to become 
involved in community or 
municipal energy 
governance. 
The needs of those lacking 
the capacity to engage in 
flexibility technologies 
and practices not 
recognised by many 
proposals for domestic 
and community scale 
flexibility. 
 
Concern for such ‘vulnerable’ groups and recognition of their needs was by far the most salient 
discourse within and across groups. Failure to recognise differences in citizen’s capacities to engage 
in flexibility was seen as underpinning a range of potential injustices, from the imposition of less 
accessible procedures for engagement with the energy system, to the exacerbation of existing 
patterns of inequality and marginalisation. Such concerns mirror clearly recent work by in the energy 
justice literature, in particular the notion of social and economic ‘flexibility capital’ capital proposed 
by Powells and Fell [9] as two axis along which energy injustices may be emerge. Our findings in this 
area thus suggest that not only is there a congruence between scholarly conceptualisations of 
energy justice and the moral frameworks through which citizens make sense of energy system 
governance, but that among our participants at least, ensuring equality of access to and status in 
more flexible energy systems and providing mitigation for those who may struggle was of particular 
importance in assessing the desirability of potential pathways for transitions towards energy 
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systems flexibility. Such concerns point to a belief on the part of participants that differences in 
needs and abilities ought not operate to the detriment of achieving basic goods such as warmth and 
power, or to effect the status of vulnerable groups as equal participants in more flexible energy 
systems.  
To date much of the policy discourse around systems flexibility has centred around more fairly 
reflecting the costs and benefits energy suppliers and users place on the system [2, 7]. To the extent 
that participants felt citizens and communities providing generation and flexibility services to the 
network ought to be fairly rewarded, our findings indicate some citizen support for the prevailing 
policy discourse. This was particularly true following initial discussions in framing ‘the public’ as a 
singular entity being exploited by larger energy companies. However, as discussions progressed and 
developed in nuance it became clear that a narrow focus on re-allocating costs and benefits based 
on contribution and impact upon the system is unlikely to be seen as fair or just in and of itself, 
particularly if it comes to be seen as perpetuating narrow forms of energy system participation, or 
more significantly, as creating new vulnerabilities for groups without the ability to manage them.  
While we are confident our findings reflect much of the diversity that would likely be present in a UK 
national discourse on systems flexibility, the qualitative nature of this study means we cannot be 
wholly certain of the wider salience of each fairness discourse we have identified across contexts. 
Further cross-national research would be helpful in order to assess the extent to which the energy 
justice considerations raised by citizens in this study are transferable to other national contexts. 
Similarly, more localised research in the UK, framed around the needs of a particular population or 
place, may be of value in elucidating more specific local justice concerns that could have been 
overlooked in the more abstract system and governance scale discussions which characterised this 
study. Finally, it ought to be noted that in following a relatively traditional deliberative methodology, 
this study did not go out of its way recognise and recruit participants from marginalised populations. 
As a result, while our data tells us much about concern for these groups in wider society, it does little 
to tell us how they understand their own needs. If recognition justice is to be fully realised in 
flexibility transitions, further engagement work will be needed with groups such as the elderly, 
disabled and financially disadvantaged designed specifically around their needs, a process which 
may require alternate modes of recruitment, facilitation and a focus on the needs of citizens over 
those of the energy system [59]. Given the somewhat ambivalent discourses we identified around 
the desirability of more participatory forms of energy citizenship and the difficulties some groups 
may experience in realising this, future work would also be of value in assessing the extent such 
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desires are salient in wider UK society, and identifying the measures that may be required to enable 
participation among groups who otherwise may be excluded from flexibility transitions. 
The diverse justice considerations we have found in relation to energy systems flexibility raise some 
questions for energy justice scholars. Desires for greater participation and engagement in energy 
system processes point to claims rooted in both procedural and recognition justice. However, such 
claims sat uneasily alongside recognition and distributive concerns for vulnerable populations which 
may emerge if the needs of less capable groups go unrecognised. Discourses relating to 
compensation for services rendered to the system represented an alternative framing of fairness 
less amenable to incorporation within an energy justice framework. On one level claims for 
compensation may be read as a response to alienation and distributive injustices which participants 
perceived as being perpetrated by large energy companies on consumers. However, matters 
become more complicated when discussion turned to the new inequalities such a system of 
compensation may give rise to, particularly if markets for flexibility provision do not recognise and 
account for the diverse needs and abilities which may hinder participation in flexibility provision for 
some. Under these circumstances a neoliberal commitment to marketized exchange as a basis for 
liberty, and hence justice would appear incompatible with both the lay conceptualisations of fairness 
and the broad thrust of social justice concerns which underpin the bulk of the energy justice 
literature.  
These tensions are by no means insurmountable. Cappers et al. [87] have found that, under carefully 
designed ToU systems, vulnerable groups need not suffer adverse impacts and may in fact benefit 
financially from flexible energy systems which compensate users for services rendered to the 
system. Incentives for storage could be designed in such a way as to specifically target the needs of 
the energy poor and vulnerable, or to socialise the costs of flexibility rather than imposing regressive 
impacts on less well-off households [14, 31]. Enhanced levels of engagement by some need not 
preclude socialised provision for others; although in some cases such as district heating, trade-offs 
may need to be made in order for socialised systems of provision to become viable [88]. In such 
instances the overriding principle among our participants bore striking resemblance to those found 
in the energy justice literature, namely that the needs and abilities of the vulnerable first need to be 
recognised , and if necessary mitigating steps should be taken to ensure broad and equal access to 
energy services and decision processes [32, 53, 61]. How such a recommendation might be 
operationalised in practice should be a priority for future energy justice research into systems 
flexibility. No one governance mechanism examined in this study emerged free of ambivalence 
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among our participants. At this stage we would thus recommend regulatory structures remain open 
to experimentation and participation by a range of new actors in order to find a balance of 
governance mechanisms that can meet system requirements while satisfying as broad a range of 
justice concerns as possible, but with an overarching commitment to protecting the vulnerable. 
Data Availability 
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used can be found at: http://www.restless.org.uk/project-results or requested via the following DOI 
address: http://doi.org/10.17035/d.2018.0052852533  
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